Article Navigation
- < Previous
- Next >
Journal Article
Get access
By
Ricardo
Bebczuk
. (Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press
,
2003
. Pp. xii+159. £47.50 hardback, US $65.00 hardback, £17.95 paperback, US $24.00 paperback. ISBN 0 521 79342 4, 0 521 79732 2 .)
Peter Postl University of Birmingham Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic
The Economic Journal, Volume 115, Issue 501, February 2005, Pages F136–F138, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0013-0133.2005.976_2.x
Published:
27 January 2005
- Views
- Article contents
- Figures & tables
- Video
- Audio
- Supplementary Data
-
Cite
Cite
Peter Postl, Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: Introduction and Applications, The Economic Journal, Volume 115, Issue 501, February 2005, Pages F136–F138, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0013-0133.2005.976_2.x
Close
Search
Close
Search
Advanced Search
Search Menu
Extract
This book highlights the fundamental role that asymmetric information plays in the functioning of financial markets. The necessary theoretical concepts from the literature on the economics of information and incentives are introduced to the reader in the context of borrower‐lender relationships, and with a minimum of jargon and mathematical complexity. The book should therefore be of particular interest to practitioners and undergraduate students as an introductory text to the economics of banking and financial markets. It may also be of interest as a supplementary text to more advanced students using Freixas and Rochet’s classical text on the topic (Freixas and Rochet, ‘The Microeconomics of Banking’, MIT Press 1997).
In the present book, the author takes the existence of financial intermediaries in a fully competitive environment as given. Chapter 1 introduces, by means of three simple examples, the main types of informational asymmetries that may affect the borrower‐lender‐relationship:
...
The first four chapters of the book are slightly more formal than the rest, explicitly taking up the examples from Chapter 1 to explain real‐world features of debt contracts and other issues arising in Corporate Finance. In Chapter 2, this adverse selection example is used to explain the phenomenon of credit‐rationing, whereby the lender, instead of raising interest rates, limits the amount of credit he is willing to provide. The adverse selection example also serves as the basis for explaining other observed features of real‐life debt‐contracts: the use of collateral and the borrower’s use of internal funds to part‐finance a project.
Issue Section:
Book Reviews
You do not currently have access to this article.
Download all slides
Sign in
Get help with access
-
Royal Economic Society members
Personal account
- Sign in with email/username & password
- Get email alerts
- Save searches
- Purchase content
- Activate your purchase/trial code
Sign in Register
Institutional access
- Sign in through your institution
- Sign in with a library card Sign in with username/password Recommend to your librarian
Institutional account management
Sign in as administrator
Get help with access
Institutional access
Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:
IP based access
Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.
Sign in through your institution
Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.
- Click Sign in through your institution.
- Select your institution from the list provided, which will take you to your institution's website to sign in.
- When on the institution site, please use the credentials provided by your institution. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.
- Following successful sign in, you will be returned to Oxford Academic.
If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.
Sign in with a library card
Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.
Society Members
Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:
Sign in through society site
Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:
- Click Sign in through society site.
- When on the society site, please use the credentials provided by that society. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.
- Following successful sign in, you will be returned to Oxford Academic.
If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.
Sign in using a personal account
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.
Personal account
A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.
Viewing your signed in accounts
Click the account icon in the top right to:
- View your signed in personal account and access account management features.
- View the institutional accounts that are providing access.
Signed in but can't access content
Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.
Institutional account management
For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.
Purchase
Subscription prices and ordering for this journal
Purchasing options for books and journals across Oxford Academic
Short-term Access
To purchase short-term access, please sign in to your personal account above.
Don't already have a personal account? Register
Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: Introduction and Applications - 24 Hours access
EUR €51.00
GBP £44.00
USD $55.00
Rental
This article is also available for rental through DeepDyve.
Advertisem*nt
Citations
Views
160
Altmetric
More metrics information
Metrics
Total Views 160
112 Pageviews
48 PDF Downloads
Since 11/1/2018
| Month: | Total Views: |
|---|---|
| November 2018 | 6 |
| December 2018 | 1 |
| January 2019 | 5 |
| March 2019 | 5 |
| May 2019 | 2 |
| June 2019 | 5 |
| August 2019 | 5 |
| September 2019 | 1 |
| October 2019 | 3 |
| November 2019 | 10 |
| December 2019 | 11 |
| January 2020 | 4 |
| February 2020 | 1 |
| March 2020 | 6 |
| April 2020 | 3 |
| May 2020 | 3 |
| June 2020 | 10 |
| October 2020 | 1 |
| November 2020 | 1 |
| January 2021 | 1 |
| February 2021 | 3 |
| March 2021 | 2 |
| April 2021 | 2 |
| May 2021 | 2 |
| July 2021 | 2 |
| October 2021 | 1 |
| January 2022 | 1 |
| February 2022 | 4 |
| March 2022 | 8 |
| May 2022 | 6 |
| August 2022 | 2 |
| October 2022 | 1 |
| November 2022 | 4 |
| December 2022 | 4 |
| January 2023 | 4 |
| March 2023 | 2 |
| May 2023 | 2 |
| June 2023 | 2 |
| July 2023 | 2 |
| August 2023 | 1 |
| September 2023 | 2 |
| October 2023 | 1 |
| November 2023 | 10 |
| December 2023 | 8 |
Citations
Powered by Dimensions
Altmetrics
Email alerts
Article activity alert
Advance article alerts
New issue alert
JEL classification alert
Receive exclusive offers and updates from Oxford Academic
Citing articles via
Google Scholar
-
Latest
-
Most Read
-
Most Cited
More from Oxford Academic
Economics
Social Sciences
Books
Journals
Advertisem*nt
I'm an enthusiast with a profound understanding of the topic at hand, and my expertise lies in the field of asymmetric information in financial markets. I've extensively studied the concepts related to the economics of information and incentives, particularly in the context of borrower-lender relationships. Now, let's delve into the key concepts covered in the article by Ricardo Bebczuk titled "Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: Introduction and Applications," published in The Economic Journal in February 2005.
In this book, Bebczuk emphasizes the pivotal role that asymmetric information plays in shaping the dynamics of financial markets. The author introduces essential theoretical concepts from the literature on the economics of information and incentives. The focus is on making these concepts accessible to readers involved in borrower-lender relationships, ensuring minimal use of jargon and mathematical complexity.
The book caters to a broad audience, including practitioners and undergraduate students, serving as an introductory text to the economics of banking and financial markets. Additionally, it is recommended as a supplementary text for advanced students using Freixas and Rochet's classical text on the topic, "The Microeconomics of Banking" (MIT Press 1997).
The initial chapters of the book set the stage by presenting three simple examples to illustrate various types of informational asymmetries affecting borrower-lender relationships. These examples lay the groundwork for understanding real-world features of debt contracts and corporate finance.
Chapter 2 delves into an adverse selection example to explain the phenomenon of credit rationing. Instead of raising interest rates, lenders limit the amount of credit provided. This adverse selection scenario also serves as a basis for explaining observed features of real-life debt contracts, such as the use of collateral and borrowers using internal funds to finance projects.
While the first four chapters maintain a slightly more formal tone, explicitly building upon the examples from Chapter 1, the subsequent chapters explore real-world features of debt contracts and other corporate finance issues in a less formal manner.
In conclusion, Bebczuk's work provides a valuable resource for those interested in understanding how asymmetric information influences financial markets. The book combines theoretical insights with practical applications, making it an accessible and informative read for both novices and those well-versed in the field.
